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      PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-1114 
___________ 
 
GEORGE VASQUEZ, 
 
   
 
Appellant 
v. 
 
WARDEN STRADA 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 11-cv-1710) 
District Judge:  Honorable James M. Munley 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 1, 2012 
 
Before:  SLOVITER, SMITH and COWEN, 
 
Circuit Judges 
(Opinion filed: June 1, 2012) 
 
George Vasquez, Appellant, Pro Se 
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J. Justin Blewitt, Jr., Esq. 
Office of United States Attorney 
235 North Washington Avenue 
P.O. Box 309, Suite 311 
Scranton, PA 18503 
 
 Counsel for Appellee 
 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Appellant George Vasquez was sentenced in 
December 1993 in the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York to a term of imprisonment of 
262 months for conspiracy to distribute heroin and for 
possession of heroin.  In January 1996, Vasquez was 
sentenced in the United States District Court for the Middle 
District of Pennsylvania to a term of imprisonment of 14 
months, to run consecutively to his New York sentence, for 
possession of a prohibited object.  Vasquez’s current 
projected release date with good conduct time is October 10, 
2012. 
 
 The Second Chance Act of 2007, which applies here, 
increases a federal prisoner’s eligibility for pre-release 
placement in a halfway house from 6 to 12 months, and 
requires the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to make an individual 
determination that ensures that the placement is “of sufficient 
duration to provide the greatest likelihood of successful 
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reintegration into the community.”  18 U.S.C. § 
3624(c)(6)(C).  In accordance with the Act, regulations were 
issued so that placement in a community correctional facility 
by the BOP is conducted in a manner consistent with 18 
U.S.C. § 3621(b).  See 28 C.F.R. § 570.22.  In addition to the 
individual determination under section 3621(b), a prisoner’s 
participation in, or completion of, Inmate Skills Development 
programs within the institution is considered separately to 
determine if additional placement time is warranted as an 
incentive under 42 U.S.C. § 17541, the Federal prisoner 
reentry initiative.  Section 17541 requires the BOP to 
“provide incentives for prisoner participation in skills 
development programs.”  Id. at §17541(a)(1)(G).  One such 
incentive may “at the discretion of the [BOP]” include “the 
maximum allowable period in a community confinement 
facility.”  Id.
 
 at § 17541(a)(2)(A). 
 On April 20, 2011, Vasquez’s Unit Team met to 
review his pre-release needs.  As a result of this review, 
Vasquez was recommended for a 151--180 day placement in 
a Residential Re-entry Center (“RRC”).  In making its 
assessment, the Unit Team considered Vasquez’s criminal 
history, his community and financial resources, his 
disciplinary history, his employment skills, and family 
resources.  Finally, Vasquez's institutional programming, 
specifically, his participation in or completion of Inmate 
Skills Development programs, was considered separately to 
determine whether additional RRC time was warranted under 
§ 17541.  It was noted that although Vasquez completed some 
programming courses, he had not regularly participated in 
educational programs during his extensive incarceration 
period.  Vasquez’s referral to community placement was 
subsequently approved by the Warden.   
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 On September 14, 2011, Vasquez filed a petition for 
writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, in the United States 
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania.  In this 
petition, Vasquez argued that the BOP failed to comply with 
the Federal prisoner reentry initiative, and that the BOP 
improperly amended section 3621(b) by unlawfully adding a 
sixth factor to trick inmates into thinking that they have been 
considered for the incentives that were never properly 
implemented by the BOP.  Vasquez sought an order directing 
the BOP to grant him a community placement of 12 months.  
He also requested an order compelling the BOP to explain 
why the incentives were never created. 
 
 The BOP submitted an answer, arguing that Vasquez 
had not exhausted his administrative remedies.  In the 
alternative, the BOP argued that Vasquez’s habeas corpus 
claims lacked merit.  In an order entered on December 29, 
2011, the District Court agreed with both of the BOP’s 
arguments and denied the habeas corpus petition.  Vasquez 
appeals. 
 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291; United 
States v. Cepero, 224 F.3d 256, 264-65 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(certificate of appealability not required to appeal from denial 
of section 2241 petition).  Vasquez may resort to federal 
habeas corpus to challenge a decision to limit his RRC 
placement, Woodall v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 
235, 243-44 (3d Cir. 2005).  However, prior to filing his 
petition, he was required to exhaust his administrative 
remedies.  Moscato v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 98 F.3d 757, 
760 (3d Cir. 1996).  Vasquez conceded before the District 
Court that he did not exhaust his administrative remedies, but 
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argued that exhaustion was not necessary prior to filing the 
instant petition. 
 
 We have held that a prisoner need not exhaust 
administrative remedies where the issue presented involves 
only statutory construction, Bradshaw v. Carlson
 
, 682 F.2d 
1050, 1052 (3d Cir. 1981), but Vasquez asked the District 
Court to direct the BOP to provide him with the maximum 
12- month RRC placement.  Contrary to his assertion in the 
proceedings below, he was not merely challenging the 
construction of the Second Chance Act, or the BOP’s 
implementation of the Federal prisoner reentry initiative. 
Exhaustion was required in his case, and Vasquez’s habeas 
corpus petition properly was dismissed for failing to exhaust 
administrative remedies. 
 We further agree with the District Court that 
Vasquez’s habeas corpus petition lacks merit in any event.  
Our review is limited to whether the BOP abused its 
discretion. See Barden v. Keohane, 921 F.2d 476, 478 (3d 
Cir. 2010).  The BOP exercises its authority pursuant to the 
Second Chance Act to determine individual prisoner RRC 
placements by applying the five factors set forth in section 
3621(b).1
                                              
1 Section 3621(b) states:  
  The sixth factor used by the BOP is participation 
 
(b) Place of imprisonment. -- The Bureau of Prisons shall 
designate the place of the prisoner’s imprisonment. The 
Bureau may designate any available penal or correctional 
facility that meets minimum standards of health and 
habitability established by the Bureau, whether maintained by 
the Federal Government or otherwise and whether within or 
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and/or completion of Skills Development programs pursuant 
to 42 U.S.C. § 17541.  The record establishes that the BOP 
gave Vasquez an individual review of the five statutory 
factors contained in section 3621(b), and the additional factor 
of his participation and/or completion of Skills Development 
programs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 17541, prior to 
recommending that he receive a 151--180 day placement.   
 
 Having reviewed the record, and the arguments on 
appeal, we see no abuse of discretion in the way that the 
section 3621(b) factors were balanced with the goals of the 
Second Chance Act in Vasquez’s case.  Indeed, Vasquez 
received appropriate consideration for the maximum 
allowable period of community placement, as reflected by the 
BOP’s comments concerning his skills development 
completion, his strong ties to the community, his significant 
financial resources, and his housing needs.  (See
                                                                                                     
without the judicial district in which the person was 
convicted, that the Bureau determines to be appropriate and 
suitable, considering --  
 DC dkt #8, 
(1) the resources of the facility contemplated;  
(2) the nature and circumstances of the offense;  
(3) the history and characteristics of the prisoner;  
(4) any statement by the court that imposed the sentence -- 
(A) concerning the purposes for which the sentence to 
imprisonment was determined to be warranted; or (B) 
recommending a type of penal or correctional facility as 
appropriate; and  
(5) any pertinent policy statement issued by the Sentencing 
Commission pursuant to section 994(a)(2) of title 28 . . .   
 
18 U.S.C. § 3621(b). 
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Ex. 2, p. 44.)  The District Court properly concluded that the 
BOP did not abuse its discretion in reaching the determination 
that a 5 to 6 month placement is of sufficient duration to 
account for Vasquez’s history.  
 
 We also agree with the District Court that Vasquez 
was unable to demonstrate that the BOP failed to comply with 
the Federal prisoner reentry initiative.  Vasquez claimed that 
BOP violated the statute when it failed to develop any 
incentives for participation in Inmate Skills Development 
Programming other than the incentive of consideration for the 
maximum period in an RRC.  Although the Second Chance 
Act requires the BOP to establish incentives for prisoner 
participation in skills development programs, the statute does 
not require that any particular incentive be established.  See
 
 
42 U.S.C. §§ 17541(a)(1)(G) and (2).  Moreover, Vasquez 
received appropriate consideration for the maximum 
allowable period of community placement.  
 For all of these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of 
the District Court. 
 
